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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between trust and macroe-
conomic volatility. In a cross section of countries, we show that higher
trust is associated with lower macroeconomic instability. We use the
inherited trust of Americans as an instrumental variable of trust in
their origin country to overcome all potential reverse causality con-
cerns. We use changes in inherited trust over the XXth century to
show that increasing trust also decreases volatility across time. Thus,
trust is shown to be an important determinant of macroeconomic sta-
bility both in space and time. Finally, we show that trust reduces
investment volatility but not public expenditure volatility.
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1 Introduction
The cost of real macroeconomic volatility in terms of well-being as been
shown by Wolfers (2003) to be quantitatively important. Thus, all the factors
that are able to foster or weaken it deserve attention.
This paper investigates the relationship between trust and macroeconomic
instability. In a cross section of countries, higher trust is correlated with
weaker macroeconomic volatility. We focus on this relationship and test al-
ternative determinants of macroeconomic stability. We disentangle backward
causality by using inherited trust of Americans immigrants as an indicator
of latent trust in their origin country. Then, we use changes in inherited
trust between 1910 and 1970 to show that trust also reduces macroeconomic
instability across time at the country level. Last, we turn back to the cross-
country relationship and show that trust weakens the volatility of investment,
but not of public expenditure.
In gure 1, trust is measured in each country by the share of people who
answer most people can be trusted  to the following question of the World
Values Survey between 1981 and 2008 : Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in deal-
ing with people? . Macroeconomic instability is represented by the standard
deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate between 1970 and 2007. The
negative relationship between these two variables is highly signicant. Dier-
ences in trust explain up to a third of cross country dierences in volatility.
The fact that cultural traits such as norms of cooperation, civic spirit or
beliefs regarding the behavior of others have an impact on macroeconomic
performance has been massively explored in the literature. See for exam-
ple Knack and Keefer (1997) and Algan and Cahuc (2010) among others.
However, macroeconomic stability remains an unexplored economic outcome
that may be in part explained by trust as suggested by the relationship we
mentioned.
Trust is an indicator of social capital. This later concept has been dened
by Putman (2000) as the collective values of all social networks and the
inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each others.
Thus, trust represents a set of beliefs that favor inter-personal cooperation
within the society. Trust may thus favor economic performance.
Trust may favor macroeconomic stability through two channels. First,
since trust implies extended civic behavior, it may be associated with better
economic management by the authorities if it reects a greater cohesion of the
2
Figure 1: Relationship between the standard deviation of real GDP per capita
growth rate 1970-2007 and trust 1981-2008.
society. Indeed, it has been shown by Knack and Keefer (1997) that countries
with higher trust have also better institutions. According to Acemoglu et
al. (2003), countries with better institutions exhibit lower macroeconomic
volatility. Hence, if trust deters the discretionary use of public expenditures it
can thus implies weaker macroeconomic volatility due to less volatile policies.
Second, following Glaeser et al. (2000), trust, the most general dimension
of social capital, is closely linked to trustworthiness.
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Hence, individual trust
can be considered as empathy or as an individual commitment to behave well
with other agents. This decreases costs of interactions and allows to build
expectations and plans with greater certainty. In line with this reasoning,
Knack and Keefer (1997) documented a positive relationship between trust
and the share of investment in GDP. But if trust makes investment higher,
it should also make it more stable over time, what is also likely to smooth
aggregate output. Although explaining the deep mechanisms of these two
channels at the individual level is beyond the scope of this paper, these two
explanations are tested in the last section,where we show that trust is higly
negatively correlated with the volatility of investment but not with the one
1
This assertion has been discussed by Fehr et al. (2003) and Sapienza et al. (2007).
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of public expenditure.
These channels from trust, and social capital in general, to macroeco-
nomic stability can be found under alternative and various forms in the liter-
ature that investigates the impact of culture and social capital on economic
outcomes. In that dimension, this paper is closely related to all researches
that aim to point a link from social capital to economic outcomes.
After the funding pieces of work run by Putman (1993), lots of evidence
about the impact of social capital on economic performance have been raised
by scholars. Knack and Keefer (1997) showed that countries with higher
social capital have also better institutions, higher and more equal incomes,
and a better educated population. Similar evidence have been provided by
Tabellini (2005) in the case of European regions. Guiso et al. (2006, 2007 and
2008) presented some evidence about the way economic experiences from the
distant past may shape current economic performance, through transmission
of adequate norms. Dincer and Uslaner (2007) have found a positive rela-
tionship between trust and growth. More recently, Algan and Cahuc (2010)
provide new evidence regarding the impact of trust on economic develop-
ment. See also Zack and Knack (2001), Knack (2001), and Tabellini (2007,
2008) for additional developments.
A key aspect of this literature is about the issue of the malleability of
beliefs with respect to current economic situation. In rough terms, a rst
approach considers that norms and values of a society are very sticky and
slow moving parameters and therefore weakly altered by current events ; on
the contrary, a second approach emphasizes the changes in beliefs induced
by changes in the current economic situation. Our view is closer to the
former approach. In this paper, we assume that trust is a latent component
of a society. Consequently, we consider that latent culture is unaected by
macroeconomic volatility. Our rst set of results do rely on this assumption.
Indeed, we rst measure trust trough the widely used question of the
World Values Survey, using the share of trusting people as a proxy for gener-
alized trust at the country level during the last quarter of the 20th century.
However, the hypothesis that current measure of trust may be impacted by
current macroeconomic outcomes cannot be fully rejected. For example, it
has been shown by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) that people who expe-
rienced recessions during early adulthood are likely to have lower individual
social capital. Hence, we need a measure of trust at the country level that
is unaltered by macroeconomic instability. Subsequently, we conrm earlier
results by using inherited trust of Americans as an instrument for the latent
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trust in their origin country. This method, inspired by Carroll et al. (1994)
and used by Fernandez and Fogli (2009) among others, overcome all potential
reverse causality eects. As a result, we will conclude that trust decreases
macroeconomic volatility in space.
However, the later results do not mean that higher trust is associated
with higher economic stability at the country level. In order to investigate
this question, we need a time-varying measure of trust. Such a measure does
not exist for a long time because values surveys have only been conducted
and generalized since 1980. Consequently, to overcome data shortage regard-
ing the time variation of trust, we use the methodology developed by Algan
and Cahuc (2010) to track changes in trust using changes in inherited trust
measured with dierent waves of Americans immigrants. This method allows
us to exploit the changes in trust over the XXth century to show that coun-
tries which have experienced increasing trust also experienced a decrease in
macroeconomic volatility.
In all our estimations, trust is proved to be an important determinant of
macroeconomic stability. However, it is not the only one. A rich literature has
examined the key determinants of macroeconomic volatility. Most of theses
papers focus on the institutional and political context. Alesina and Drazen
(1991) argue that stabilizations are delayed because interest groups ght to
know who will bear the economic burden. In the same vain, Rodrik (1999)
shows that the greater the latent social conicts in a society and the weaker
its institutions of conict management, the larger are the eects of external
shocks on growth. In the case of less developed countries, Acemoglu et al.
(2003) states that macroeconomic uctuations arise from turbulence created
by politicians in weakly institutionalized economies. See also Fernandez and
Rodrik (2001), François and Zabojnik (2005), and Acemoglu et al. (2008) for
a focus on reforms feasibility. This literature points out the important role of
institutions quality in economic management. Our results conrm this eect
which goes in the same direction as the one of trust. This lets room for a
joint interpretation of institutions and beliefs, these two variables mutually
reinforcing, as stressed by François (2008).
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data we used and the estimation strategy. Section 3 presents simple
cross section estimates. Section 4 use inherited trust as an instrument for
trust in cross section and panel estimations, this allow to overcome backward
causality between economic uctuations and trust and to asses the within
eect of trust on macroeconomic volatility. Section 5 distinguishes between
5
the volatility of the dierent components of GDP. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Data and estimation strategy
This section documents our estimation strategies and describes the various
data used in this analysis.
Cross-country regressions To investigate the eect of trust on macroe-
conomic instability in space, we estimate following cross country model using
ordinary least squares :
V olatilityi = a0 + a1Trusti +
nX
j=2
ajxji + "i; (1)
where V olatilityi is an indicator of macroeconomic instability in country i
and Trusti is the measure of trust in country i for the period of interest. xji
is a control variable which may explain cross section dierences in macroeco-
nomic volatility, "i is the error term. Some specications also include regional
dummies for Africa, Latin America, Central America, Asia and Middle East
to control for common economic patterns. If trust has a negative impact on
macroeconomic volatility across countries, then the coecient of trust, i.e.
a1, will be negative and signicant.
Panel regressions To investigate the eect of trust on macroeconomic
stability across time, we estimate following panel data model using ordinary
least squares :
V olatilityit = a0 + a1Trustit +
nX
j=2
ajxjit + Ii + "it; (2)
where the notations are as above, except that subscript it denotes country
i at time t. Equation (2) also includes country xed eects denoted by
Ii. Consequently, the estimation of this model gives information about the
within eect of trust on economic volatility. If trust has a negative impact on
macroeconomic volatility across time at the country level, then the coecient
of trust, i.e. a1, will be negative and signicant.
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Measuring trust For each country, we measure generalized trust as the
share of people who answer most people can be trusted  to following question
of the World Values Survey between 1981 and 2008 : Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people ? . The alternative answer is can't be too
careful . One of our main hypothesis is that trust is a very slow moving
parameter at the country level. Therefore, the later measure of trust is
supposed to be a general indicator of social capital over the whole period of
interest. See Knack (2001) for a discussion of the validity of generalized trust
as an indicator of national social capital.
Inherited trust of Americans This method relies on the assumption that
dierences in trust among Americans are linked to their ancestors country of
origin. We estimate the following expression using a probit model :
Trustci = a0 +
nX
j=1
ajxji + Ic + "i; (3)
where Trustci is the answer of individual i, claiming that its ancestors came
from country c, to the trust question of the General Social Survey : Gener-
ally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't
be too careful in life? . Ic is the origin country xed eect, Norway being the
omitted category
2
, xji an individual characteristic of respondent i and "i the
error term. Trustci is equals to 1 if individual i originating from country c
answer most people can be trusted , 0 elsewhere. Following Algan and Cahuc
(2010), the later model is estimated and using Americans of second, third
and fourth generations.
Data on macroeconomic volatility All our macroeconomic indicators
are computed from the Penn World Table. All variables are constant price
entries. We used data of 57 countries over the period 1970-2007. As a
rst measure of instability, we compute the standard deviation of GDP per
capita growth rate. We also use the frequency of negative growth years.
When estimating the eect of changes in inherited trust across time, we use
the Maddison database to compute the same volatility indicators over the
periods 1910-1940 and 1970-2000.
2
The choice of Norway as the reference origin country is purely arbitrary and does not
drive our results.
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Alternative volatility determinants Testing determinants of macroeco-
nomic instability that may challenge trust, we use indicators of institutional
quality, education and fractionalization in the society. We measure dier-
ences in political institutions by using means of the combined polity score
and the constraint on the executive variables from the Polity IV data set.
Education is represented by the average schooling years in the total popula-
tion aged 25 and over from Barro and Lee (2000). Ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization is from Easterly and Levine (1997), whereas ethnic fractionalization
is from Alesina et al. (2003).
3
Macroeconomic control variables Instability regressions also include
macroeconomic control variables obtained from the Penn World Table. We
follow Anbarci et al. (2005) by using initial wealth, initial population, public
expenditure and openness. Public expenditure is measured as the average
ratio of public expenditure to GDP between 1970 and 2007, and openness as
the average value of exports and imports over GDP between 1970 and 2007.
Initial GDP per capita and population are taken in 1970. Cross-country
regressions also include the average growth rate over the period and the
standard deviation of terms of trade from the World Development Indicators.
3 Cross section estimates
This section documents the empirical relationship between trust and macroe-
conomic volatility in space. We present results of standard OLS estimations.
To investigate the eect of trust on macroeconomic stability, we rst es-
timate equation (1) with ordinary least squares for 57 countries
4
over the
period 1970 - 2007. This period is chosen because it oers the maximum ob-
servations for both macroeconomic and control variables. Summary statistics
3
All these variables have been gathered thanks to the Quality of Government data set
: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/
4
Observed countries are following : Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Repub-
lic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Egypt, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zim-
babwe.
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of used variables are presented in table 6, presented in appendix.
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation, taking the standard devi-
ation of GDP per capita growth rate between 1970 and 2007 as a measure
of macroeconomic instability. Column 1 shows the simplest relationship be-
tween trust and volatility. The estimated coecient of trust is negative and
highly signicant. Figure 1 presented above depicts the corresponding rela-
tionship.
Columns 2 introduces the average growth rate over the period. This
variable is correlated both with volatility, according to Ramey and Ramey
(1995), and with trust, according to Algan and Cahuc (2010). The estimated
coecient on trust keeps the same order of magnitude and is still signicant
at the 1% level. Columns 3 and 4 subsequently introduce initial GDP per
capita and population as explanatory variables. This decreases the size of
the estimated coecient of trust but leaves it highly signicant. In column
4, the estimated coecients for initial wealth and population are both neg-
ative and signicant. A one standard deviation increase in trust
5
induces
a 0:53 decrease in the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate.
As a comparison, a similar change in initial GDP per capita (population)
induces a 1:21 (0:97) decrease in volatility. Hence, the eect of trust on the
standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate is weaker that the one of
initial wealth or initial population size, but of the same order of magnitude.
Evaluated at the mean, a 0:53 decrease represents a 12% negative change in
standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate.
Columns 5 and 6 expand the set of explanatory variables by introducing
public expenditure and openness. This change of the econometric specica-
tion leaves the estimated coecient on trust broadly unchanged. Another
possible omitted variable is terms of trade shocks. Hence, we include the
standard deviation of terms of trade as a control variables in column 7.
6
Al-
though weaker, the estimated coecient of the trust variables remains highly
signicant and of the same order of magnitude. In column 8, we introduce re-
gional dummies for Africa, Asia, Latin America, Central America and Middle
East. This leaves unchanged the value of the coecient related to trust.
In column 9, we present the results of the most demanding specication,
i.e. including all the above mentioned control variables. According to these
5
In this sample, the standard deviation of the trust variable equals 0:16, which means
that a one standard deviation increase in trust is comparable to an increase of 16 percentage
points in the share of trusting people.
6
Terms of trade data are missing for three countries : Austria, Cyprus and Finland.
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results, a one standard deviation increase in trust induces a 0:52 decrease in
volatility whereas comparable eects of changes in initial population equals
0:91. Thus, the results presented in table 1 show that trust still explains a
major part of cross country dierences macroeconomic volatility when con-
trolling for a large set of macroeconomic variables.
Table 2 tests alternative determinants of macroeconomic stability. In-
deed, it is possible that the eect of trust on macroeconomic volatility is
mediated by omitted variables, such as the quality of institutions, education
or fractionalization. If this turns to be true, then the estimated coecient
of trust should be weaker and less signicant when introducing these vari-
ables. All regressions include the former macroeconomic variables as control
variables, except terms of trade changes
7
. Columns 1 to 5 show estimated
coecients of trust and alternative variables, entered separately. In column
1, we rst test the eect of institutional quality on macroeconomic stabil-
ity. Institutional quality has a negative and signicant eect on economic
instability. A one standard deviation increase in institutional score decreases
volatility by 0:95. This eect is just two times bigger than the one associated
with a comparable change in trust (0:51). The constraint on the executive,
a component of the Polity IV combined score is introduced in column 2
and does not seem to have any eect on the stander deviation of GDP per
capita growth rate. The average number of schooling years or the level of
fractionalization (measured using two dierent methods, i.e. ethnic and eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization) do not bring any additional explanation and
leave the estimated coecient of trust unchanged.
These later results suggest that collective norms and values are more likely
to produce good conditions for smooth economical growth than ethnic unity
or education. Moreover, this also sustain the hypothesis that generalized
trust is not only a matter of education, nor of ethnic proximity. Column 6
show the results when including all alternative variables together. Results
remain unchanged. Column 7 presents the estimated coecient for the most
demanding specication, including regional dummies. In this specication,
the estimated eect of a one standard deviation in trust equals 0:65 whereas
the one associated with a similar change in institutions quality equals 0:87.
Hence, both eects have the same order of magnitude. Note that a 0:65
7
Terms of trade changes are excluded because data are missing for Austria, Cyprus
and Finland. We run the same regressions including terms of trade changes and excluding
these three countries, but this does not alter the results.
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Figure 2: Relationship between the frequency of negative real GDP per capita
growth 1970-2007 and trust 1981-2008.
change in standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate represents
a 15% drop in volatility.
To sum up results presented in table 1 and 2, we note that trust is sub-
stantially associated with macroeconomic stability, measured as the standard
deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate, and that institutional quality
is the strongest alternative explanatory variable. Having said that, we now
focus on an alternative measure of macroeconomic instability in order to get
more evidences about the eect of trust on economic stability.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between trust and the frequency of neg-
ative growth of real GDP per capita. Tables 7 and 8, presented in appendix,
replicate the estimations presented above but using the frequency of nega-
tive growth of real GDP per capita as dependent variable. The estimated
coecient of trust is negative and signicant in all specications. Column
7 of table 8, which presents estimated coecients for the most demanding
specication, gives a point estimate of ¡0:123 for the coecient of trust.
The corresponding eect on the frequency of negative real GDP per capita
growth for a one standard deviation change equals ¡0:019. Evaluated at the
mean, this represents a 16% drop in volatility. Note that when including
12
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regional dummies, trust is the unique signicant explanatory variable.
Higher trust is associated with lower macroeconomic volatility measured
as the frequency of negative growth years. Thus, this alternative indicator
of macroeconomic instability conrm earlier results. Note that the two most
demanding specications lead to following conclusion : a 10 percentage points
increase in the share of trusty people implies a 10% drop in macroeconomic
volatility.
4 Instrumental variables estimates
In this section, we use the inherited trust of US immigrants as an instrument
for trust in their origin country. We rst present the estimation method for
inherited trust. Then, we use inherited trust as an instrument for trust in
cross section estimations. Finally, we use changes in inherited trust to track
changes in trust at the country level over the XXth century.
Inherited trust of Americans
It has been shown by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) that macroeconomic
events, in particular macroeconomic shocks, are likely to alter beliefs of
agents. As a consequence, aggregate trust could be inuenced by past and
current macroeconomic volatility. Although this may look totally opposed
to our assumption about social capital, their approach is compatible with
ours. In fact, they argue that beliefs are formed during early adulthood, this
is the so called impressionable years hypothesis, and remain almost un-
changed after it. Hence, beliefs are changing slowly over time because only a
fraction of the population is likely to change beliefs as a reaction to current
macroeconomic situation. Thus, our identication hypothesis remain plausi-
ble despite the potential reverse causality in the medium term. However, to
be sure to avoid all reverse causality concerns and consistent with our view of
deep trust as a indicator of latent social capital, we now take inherited trust
of US immigrant as an alternative measure of trust in their origin country.
This strategy has for main advantage to avoid all eects of potential re-
verse causality from macroeconomic instability to trust. This approach relies
on the assumption that dierences in beliefs among Americans with foreign
origins are linked to dierences in beliefs between their countries of origin. In
order to be sure that observed Americans have not been aected by macroe-
14
Figure 3: Inherited trust of US immigrants in 1970.
conomic volatility after 1970, we focus on individuals whose forbears have
immigrated before 1970. Hence, assuming 25 years between each generation,
selected individuals are immigrants of second generation born before 1970 ;
third generation immigrants born before 1995 ; and fourth generation im-
migrants. In appendix, table 9 presents the share of trusting Americans by
origin country.
Having estimated equation (3), marginal eects are reported in table 10,
presented in appendix. Marginal eects of origin countries are also repre-
sented in gure 3. The main drawback of this approach is to shrink the
number of available countries from 57 to 24. Most of the least developed
countries are lost due to this method. Summary statistics for the observa-
tions used in this estimation are presented in table 9 in appendix. See table
12, also in appendix, for a detailed description of the used control variables.
Cross section instrumental variable estimates
We will now use origin country xed eects as an instrument for trust dif-
ferences in cross country regressions. Instrumental variables estimations are
15
run with 24 countries
8
. Due to data shortness, we restrict ourselves to a spec-
ication that includes trust (instrumented by inherited trust), institutions,
education, ethnic fractionalization and initial GDP per capita. Summary
statistics for this sample are presented in table 11, presented in appendix.
Table 3 displays the estimates of the eect of trust and others alternative
variables on our two indicators of macroeconomic instability. Columns 6
to 10 present the estimated coecients when including a dummy variable
for Asia. Columns 5 and 10 report the rst stage estimates of associated
regressions. The bottom lines of these columns report the F-test for excluded
instrument (the statistic equals 5:64 (5:60) for column 5 (10)), and Cragg-
Donald statistic for the Stock and Yogo (2002) test for weak instrument (the
Cragg-Donald statistic is larger than the Stock and Yogo critical value in
both columns). In all of our regressions, the estimated coecient of trust is
negative and signicant at the 5% level when standard deviation of real GDP
per capita growth rate is the dependent variable, and at the 1% level when
the frequency of negative real GDP per capita growth is used as dependent
variable.
In column 1 the dependent variable is the standard deviation of GDP per
capita growth rate. The associated p-value of the Wu-Hausman test equals
0:32. This indicates that trust is endogenous and validates the need of an
instrument. The estimated coecient of trust amounts ¡3:72. Hence, a one
standard deviation change in trust is associated with a 0:56 decrease in the
standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate. Comparable eect of the
alternative signicant explanatory variables equals 0:26 for Polity IV. Hence,
trust has the most important eect on standard deviation of GDP per capita
growth rate in this specication. Evaluated at the mean, a 0:56 change in
volatility represents a 19% move. Column 2 presents the results of corre-
sponding OLS regression. Comparing the estimated coecient suggest that
our former OLS estimates of the eect of trust on macroeconomic instability
were biased downwards.
Additional instrumental variable estimation conrm earlier results. In
column 3, we estimated the eect of trust on the frequency of negative growth
events. The estimated coecient of trust is signicant at the 1% level and
equals ¡0:63. None of the alternative explanatory variables is signicant.
8
Observed countries are following : Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, United King-
dom, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nether-
lands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, India, Portugal and Bel-
gium.
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A 10 percentage points increase in the share of trusty people induces a 6:3
percentage point decrease in the frequency of negative growth years between
1970 and 2007. Given that the average value of this indicator is 0:16, such a
change represents a 40% cut in volatility at the mean.
However, as presented in table 9 (in appendix), the estimation of inherited
trust is made from a really small number of respondent for some countries.
This is especially the case for Asian countries for example (China, India,
Japan and Philippines). This fact encourages to control for potential biases
for these countries by introducing a dummy variable. This is what we do in
the second part of table 3 (columns 6 to 10). The estimated coecients are
unchanged when including a dummy variable for Asia.
Using instrumental variables allows to avoid all endogeneity concerns and
to show that trust has a strong and signicant eect on the indicators of
macroeconomic instability in cross country regressions. Moreover, alternative
explanatory variables exhibits both weaker coecients and lower signicance
when trust is instrumented by inherited trust. Estimated eects of trust
on macroeconomic instability are of great magnitude. In the case of the
frequency of negative growth events, we estimated that a 10 percentage points
change in trust induces up to a 40% cut in the frequency of negative growth
events at the mean. Using the standard deviation of real GDP per capita
growth rate as dependent variable, the same change in trust induce a 13%
cut in volatility. This later results is closer to the eects estimated in simple
OLS regressions with more countries, but it is much stronger than the eect
estimated with OLS for the limited sample.
The results of this instrumental variable strategy oer the opportunity to
state that trust is not only associated with macroeconomic stability in a cross
section of countries, but also that trust decreases macroeconomic volatility.
Within estimates
We will now investigate whether the eect of trust on volatility is also valid
at the country level. Here, we use changes in inherited trust of US immi-
grants as a proxy for trust changes in their origin country. We follow Algan
and Cahuc (2010) by using dierent immigration waves to assess changes
in inherited trust. Accordingly, inherited trust in year T is estimated using
second generation immigrants born before T , third generation immigrants
born before T + 25 and fourth generation immigrants born before T + 50.
We estimated inherited trust in 1910 and 1970 with respect to Norwegian
17
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immigrants.
9
Due to the limited number of observations available for inher-
ited trust in 1910, our sample is restricted to 22 countries.
10
We use the
Maddison database to construct our two volatility indicators for the periods
1910-1940 and 1970-2000. The choice of this two periods is made essentially
because the estimation of inherited trust for dierent dates requires both a
sucient number of observations for each period and a sucient gap to avoid
overlapping generations.
11
Here, we estimates equation (2) using a reduced
form for instrumental variables since observed trust is not available for 1910.
In table 4, we run OLS regressions with country xed eects. All the
variables are dened with respect to Norway. We include a time dummy in
order to control for potential convergence in volatility between countries. In
even-numbered columns, we control for initial real GDP per capita in 1910
and 1970 and for the average growth rate during the two periods of interest.
All estimated coecients are non-signicant when the standard deviation
of real GDP per capita growth rate is used as dependent variable. The es-
timated coecient of inherited trust is thus not signicantly dierent from
zero. However, the corresponding coecient is negative and signicant at the
10% level when we use the frequency of negative growth events as dependent
variable. This result is robust to the introduction of initial GDP per capita
and average growth rate as control variables, the size of the coecient is un-
changed. The relationship between changes in trust and changes in volatility,
measured as the frequency of negative growth events, is represented in gure
4. According to these estimations, a 0:1 increase in inherited trust between
1910 and 1970 induces a 0:065 decrease in the dierence between a coun-
try and Norway volatility. Given that this later variable is equal to 0:10 on
average, such a change is quantitatively important.
These results show that changes in trust across time are also associated
with opposite changes in macroeconomic volatility. Thus, the earlier results
9
Inherited trust in 1910 is estimated using second generation immigrants born before
1910, third generation immigrants born before 1935 and fourth generation immigrants
born before 1960. Inherited trust in 1970 is estimated using second generation immigrants
born between 1910 and 1970, third generation immigrants born between 1935 and 1995
and fourth generation immigrants born after 1960.
10
Observed countries are following : Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
11
Although this choice is ultimately arbitrary, our results are robust to changes in the
denition of the periods, provided that the two necessary conditions mentioned in text are
satised.
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Table 4: Inherited trust and macroeconomic volatility : within estimates.
Dependent variables are
S.d. : the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate
Freq. : the frequency of negative real GDP per capita growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S.d. Freq.
Inherited trust 8.332 6.599 -0.660* -0.654*
(14.47) (14.63) (0.333) (0.325)
Average growth 0.0658 -0.0471**
(0.530) (0.0220)
Initial GDP per capita -2.100 -0.0693
(1.967) (0.0978)
Time dummy 0.178 -0.487 -0.0618** -0.0849*
(0.685) (0.885) (0.0253) (0.0412)
Constant 1.359 2.208 0.169*** 0.163**
(2.068) (2.458) (0.0505) (0.0617)
Observations 44 44 44 44
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
R-squared (within) 0.039 0.065 0.319 0.469
OLS regressions
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include country xed eects
All variables are dened with respect to Norway
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Figure 4: Relationship between changes in trust and changes in the frequency
of real GDP per capita negative growth.
found in cross country regressions are also valid across time at the country
level : increasing trust reduces macroeconomic volatility both in space and
time.
5 Volatility of GDP components
In this section, we turn back to cross country regressions and investigate how
the volatility of the dierent components of GDP is linked to trust. We use
standard OLS regressions in order to maximize the number of observations
and thus include a large number of control variables. Indeed, using instru-
mental variables as in section 4 would reduce the number of observations.
However, results presented in this section hold for instrumental variables.
The sample is identical to the one used in table 1. We computed the stan-
dard deviation of real per capita growth rate of investment, consumption and
public expenditure. Our main interest lies in the comparison between esti-
mated coecients of trust when using the volatility of investment or public
expenditure as dependent variables. Consistently with the two channels from
trust to volatility stressed in the introduction, this comparison should allow
21
to determine the most important one. Here, consumption can be seen as a
benchmark since it is a by-product of GDP.
Estimated coecients are reported in table 5. For each dependent vari-
able, we present the simplest relationship and then control by macroeco-
nomic variables and regional dummies. Columns 1, 4 and 7 show that the
estimated coecient of trust is stronger for investment than for public expen-
diture or consumption. However, the signicance of the estimated coecient
disappears in columns 8 and 9 when we introduce control variables, the stan-
dard deviation of public expenditure being the dependent variable. Although
weaker, the estimated coecient of trust remains sizable and signicant if
the dependent variable is the volatility of investment, in columns 5 and 6.
Logically, the estimated coecient of trust is close to the one found in table
1 in the case of consumption. These results suggest that the level of trust
has no eect on the volatility of public expenditure but has an eect on the
volatility of investment.
This suggests that trust has an eect on macroeconomic volatility through
the investment channel, not through the public expenditure channel. This
interpretation fosters the idea that trust acts as a social commitment which
induces greater certainty in investment. This in turn invalidates the idea
that governments create less economic turbulences in countries with higher
trust.
6 Conclusion
In a cross section of countries, trust has been shown to be negatively associ-
ated with macroeconomic instability. Higher trust reduces the frequency of
crisis and weakens the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate.
Using trust of Americans as a latent indicator of trust in their origin coun-
try, we provided additional evidence of these eects, avoiding all potential
reverse causality concerns. In particular, we showed that an increase in trust
implies a decrease in the frequency of negative growth events at the country
level. Finally, turning back to simple cross country regressions, we showed
that trust reduces the volatility of investment, but not of public expenditure.
Our estimates suggest that trust is likely to be a key determinant in
macroeconomic stability. Thus lower volatility can be added to the list of
economic outcomes favored by higher trust.
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Table 9: Summary statistics for the estimation of inherited trust in 1970.
Mean Standard deviation
Male .4662977 .498882
Age 45.72331 17.01775
Age squared 2380.203 1723.408
Married .5655215 .4957074
Protestant .5913458 .491604
Catholic .2678503 .4428562
Education 13.3693 2.825144
Employed .6915687 .4618634
White .9765583 .1513075
Income 5.483588 3.164271
Observations Share of trusting
Austria 60 0.47
Canada 326 0.4
China 11 0.73
Denmark 127 0.45
United Kingdom 3,239 0.5
Finland 54 0.5
France 394 0.43
Germany 3,359 0.44
Greece 52 0.38
Hungary 72 0.44
Ireland 2,416 0.44
Italy 861 0.38
Japan 31 0.42
Mexico 338 0.31
Netherlands 287 0.4
Norway 337 0.54
Philippines 12 0.33
Poland 433 0.42
Spain 130 0.35
Sweden 302 0.48
Switzerland 86 0.5
India 15 0.13
Portugal 42 0.36
Belgium 27 0.52
Total 13,011 0.45
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Table 10: Estimation of inherited trust in 1970.
Dependent variable is trust of US immigrant
Male 0.0130** France -0.0878***
(0.00635) (0.00379)
Age 0.0103*** Germany -0.0864***
(0.00184) (0.00251)
Age squared -6.34e-05*** Greece -0.143***
(1.90e-05) (0.00388)
Married 0.0449*** Hungary -0.0933***
(0.00763) (0.00431)
Protestant 0.00854 Ireland -0.0857***
(0.00937) (0.00444)
Catholic 0.0313 Italy -0.147***
(0.0213) (0.00971)
Education 0.0427*** Japan -0.0634**
(0.00185) (0.0276)
Employed 0.0388*** Mexico -0.106***
(0.0100) (0.0149)
White 0.102*** Netherlands -0.121***
(0.0393) (0.00152)
Income 0.00162 Philippines -0.116***
(0.00197) (0.0157)
Norway Reference Poland -0.122***
(0.00915)
Austria -0.0699*** Spain -0.132***
(0.00581) (0.00817)
Canada -0.114*** Sweden -0.0679***
(0.00735) (0.00274)
China 0.248*** Switzerland -0.0767***
(0.0309) (0.00261)
Denmark -0.0967*** India -0.308***
(0.00287) (0.0153)
United Kingdom -0.0665*** Portugal -0.169***
(0.00269) (0.00702)
Finland -0.0498*** Belgium 0.0289***
(0.00632) (0.0108)
Observations 13011
Pseudo R-squared 0.0613
Probit regression
Dummy variables are included for the year of interview
Standard erros clustered at the origin country level
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: General Social Survey control variables
All our results are robust to alternative denitions of the variables.
Sex Respondent's gender. Equals 1 for males and 0 for females.
Age Respondent's age in years.
Age squared Square of respondent's age.
Protestant and
Catholic
Respondent's religious aliation. The omitted category is
"other" or "none".
Education Completed years of formal education.
Employed Respondent's employment status. Equals 1 for full time,
part time or self employed. The omitted category is
retired, housewife, student, unemployed or other.
White Respondent's race. Equals 1 for white. The omitted
category is black or other.
Income Respondent's family income, corrected for family size. Our
measure of income is slightly dierent from the one use in
other analysis using the GSS. Usually, the GSS variable
INCOME is used as a measure of income dierences. This
variable gives information about the respondent's total
family income and is coded using 12 income brackets for the
entire period covered by the survey. Using this variable
without any transformation has two drawbacks. First, this
does not take into account the size of the family. Second,
the fact that the same coding is used for the whole period
makes it an inappropriate measure because both of ination
and the increasing standard of living. Hence, we rst create
broad family income deciles using the income variables
dened for shorter time periods (INCOME72, INCOME77,
etc.). Then, we divide this new variable by the household's
size using the HOMPOP variable.
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B Robustness checks
This section provides some robustness checks of our empirical evidence.
Longer period of time
The cross section estimates presented in this paper rely on the period 1970-
2007 because this is the period that oers the largest number of observations
for our variables. Here, we replicate the same exercise but on the period
1950-2007. This choice reduces the number of observed countries from 57
to 38. We only report the specications with the standard deviation of real
GDP per capita growth rate as dependent variable. Table 13 presents the
estimated coecients when introducing macroeconomic control variables for
the period 1950-2007. Results are virtually identical to those obtained in
table 1. In table 14, we introduce alternative explanatory variables and
replicate the results of table 2. Results are unchanged. These regressions
show that our main results do not depend on the chosen period.
Omitted variable : level of inequalities
Another possible omitted variable is inequality. In fact, more unequal coun-
tries tend to grow less and to have a population with a lower level of trust,
this may thus alter the link between trust and volatility. Hence, we take the
the Gini coecient of the World Development Indicators and replicate the
cross section regressions estimates over the period 1970-2007. A selection of
results is presented in table 15. The Gini coecient is missing for Cyprus,
so we have only 56 observations. Once we have controlled for inequalities,
the estimated coecient of other variables remains the same. Including all
variables together leaves the estimated coecient of trust unchanged.
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